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Over the last years, the intense and 
vivid debates which had developed 
around the so called mode 2 thesis 
after the publication of “The New Pro-
duction of Knowledge” (Gibbons et 
al. 1994) and “Re-Thinking Science” 
(Nowotny et al. 2001) seem to have 
significantly abated. Nevertheless, the 
controversial issues that were raised 
in those disputes are, of course, far 
from settled or out-dated. Quite to the 
contrary, the questions concerning the 
changing relations of science and so-
ciety and the potential emergence of 
new forms of knowledge production 
and expertise, termed “socially robust 
knowledge” and “socially distributed 
expertise” by Nowotny et al. (2001), 
still are highly relevant for STS. Giv-
en this background, the publication 
of Monika Kurath’s (2009) and Janus 
Hansen’s (2009) papers in the last issue 
of STI-Studies offers a good chance 
to reconsider these issues from some 
temporal distance. In my comment, I 
will make some remarks on how the 
mode 2 thesis is addressed and criti-
cised in each of the two papers and 
then, in my short conclusion, argue for 
a primarily heuristic use of this thesis 
and the concepts mentioned above.
Nanotechnology governance – 
without socially robust knowl-
edge?
In her paper on  “Nanotechnology Go-
vernance”, Monika Kurath, uses the 
concept of “socially robust knowl-
edge” in order to examine to which 
extent the alleged “governance turn” 
in recent science and technology poli-
cies is actually linked with greater ac-
countability and public participation. 
While there is obviously much talk 
of “public engagement” or “responsi-
ble technology development” in the 
field of nanosciences and nanotech-
nologies (NST), Kurath’s comparative 
analysis of 14 self-regulatory and soft 
law schemes and six public engage-
ment projects presents rather disil-
lusioning results. With regard to the 
mode 2 thesis it appears to be partic-
ularly alarming that the soft law and 
self-regulatory initiatives “considered 
little societal knowledge (…) and were 
rarely subject to external evaluation, 
testing, and improvement” (Kurath 
2009: 101) and, similarly, most of the 
public engagement projects were still 
shaped by “the notion of a boundary 
separating science and the public into 
two societal actors on either side of 
an expert/lay divide” (Kurath 2009: 
101-102).
These findings seem to explicitly con-
tradict or even refute one of the core 
assumptions of the mode 2 thesis: the 
assertion of a shift from the produc-
tion of scientifically reliable to socially 
robust knowledge. The latter is char-
acterised by Nowotny et al. (2001: 
167), besides other criteria, as “infil-
trated and improved by social knowl-
edge” and subject to frequent testing, 
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feedback and evaluation by a variety 
of actors. I would, however, suggest 
that what is undermined by Kurath’s 
findings is first and foremost a certain 
evolutionist interpretation of changes 
in the relationships of science and 
society, of expert and lay actors. This 
reading which apparently is supported 
by the mode 2 authors themselves re-
lies on the co-evolution of “mode 2 sci-
ence” and “mode 2 society” (Nowotny 
et al. 2001: 30-49) which is held to 
result in convergent trends within the 
two spheres. It thus underestimates 
the essentially political, i.e. contingent 
and contested nature of new modes 
of producing and evaluating (scien-
tific) knowledge.1 If one abandons the 
questionable background assump-
tions of co-evolutionary “coincidenc-
es and correspondences” (Nowotny 
et al. 2001: 30) between science and 
society, one gets a more differenti-
ated understanding of the shift from 
reliable to socially robust knowledge 
and its limitations. It becomes clear 
then that the extent to which environ-
mental and consumer organizations 
or “ordinary” citizens are involved 
in the production and assessment of 
knowledge primarily depends on the 
openness of institutional settings and 
policy arenas as well as on the pow-
er relations of different actor groups. 
Thus, even in the field of NST, where 
upstream public engagement recently 
became “a fashionable term in sci-
ence communication” (Kurath 2009: 
89), it seems to be the rule rather than 
the exception that established actors 
only pay lip service to the rhetoric of 
public participation. Nevertheless, Ku-
rath’s analysis also shows that some 
of the employed governance mecha-
nisms, mainly in the UK, actually did 
“provide a substantial level of ex-
change and mutual learning” (Kurath 
2009: 101). In addition, the fact that 
– after the GMO disaster in Europe – 
governments in almost all Western 
countries feel obliged to adopt at least 
1  See for more detailed criticisms of this 
point Pestre 2003; Wehling 2006a.
the rhetoric of dialogue and public en-
gagement in their NST programmes is 
striking. This exemplarily highlights 
that the legimitation and acceptability 
of new science and emerging technol-
ogies become increasingly dependent 
on wider social processes in which a 
great variety of actors potentially play 
an important role.2 Since the concept 
of socially robust knowledge reflects 
such dynamics, it proves to be a use-
ful heuristic and analytical tool to 
study how new constellations of so-
cial actors emerge in relation to the 
production of knowledge.
But the extent to which scientific 
knowledge is in fact “infiltrated” by 
social knowledge and subject to ex-
ternal evaluation cannot be not pre-
determined on a theoretical level but 
has to be established empirically. Ku-
rath’s study thus confirms the heuris-
tic fruitfulness of a central concept of 
the mode 2 thesis while her findings 
simultaneously challenge an inter-
pretation of this thesis in terms of an 
evolutionary master-trend from mode 
1 to mode 2, from reliable to socially 
robust knowledge. 
Rectifying mode 2 with Lumann?
Janus Hansen raises two more theo-
retically demanding objections to the 
mode 2 thesis. He, firstly, questions 
the assumption of a convergent and 
homogeneous transformation of all 
modern societies towards “mode 2 
societies”, an assumption which ac-
cording to Hansen is at least implicitly 
suggested by the work of Nowotny, 
Gibbons and colleagues. He rightly 
asks “how this implicit assumption of 
convergence can be transformed from 
2  Beyond the massive social conflicts over 
GMOs, there are indeed many more exam-
ples of the involvement of social actors in 
the production and assessment of (scien-
tific) knowledge. An illuminating case in 
point is the engagement of patients’ asso-
ciations and health movements in medical 
research; see for instance Epstein 1996; 
Rabeharisoa/Callon 2002; Brown 2007; 
McCormick 2009, and for an overview Ep-
stein 2008.
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a conceptual a priori into a question 
suitable for theoretically grounded, em-
pirical examination” (Hansen 2009: 72) 
and argues for comparative, especially 
cross-national research in order to ac-
count for variations in different social 
contexts.3 It should be clear from my 
comments on Kurath’s paper as well 
as my earlier criticism of the model of 
co-evolution underlying “Re-Thinking 
Science” (Wehling 2006a) that I large-
ly agree with Hansen’s suggestion. 
Likewise, I have little doubt that the 
concept of “political culture” recently 
re-adopted by Sheila Jasanoff might 
prove fruitful in order to capture vari-
ations in the ways different societies 
deal with the challenges posed by sci-
entific knowledge and novel technolo-
gies (see Hansen 2009: 79-81). I would, 
however, like to add one qualification: 
cross-national comparisons will cer-
tainly remain important but no longer 
seem sufficient to fully understand the 
variety of forms in which knowledge 
is produced, legitimized and evalu-
ated in different cultural and political 
contexts. This is due not only to the di-
minishing influence of nation-states on 
globalizing economies and sciences, 
but also to the fact that international 
or transnational institutions play an 
increasingly important role in shaping 
research and innnovation policies and 
in regulating science and technology.4 
Cross-national comparisons therefore 
have to be complemented with com-
parative research into the institution-
al cultures of different transnational 
organizations as well as with what 
I would term “cross-technological” 
comparisons. Nanotechnology, for in-
stance, is framed and institutionally 
3  One could reasonably argue that this is 
exactly what Kurath does in her paper. I 
presume, however, that Hansen argues for 
more detailed, qualitative research than 
Kurath’s rating of social robustness along a 
numerical classification. 
4  Among the sample of 20 nanotechnology 
governance projects analyzed by Kurath 
five are launched by supranational (EU) or 
international bodies (OECD) and another 
five by private actors.
dealt with similarly in many countries, 
but quite differently from other tech-
nologies such as agrobiotechnology or 
human genetics and biomedicine.
Hansen’s second criticism of the mode 
2 concept is in my view much less con-
vincing than his call for comparative 
research. Opposing the mode 2 claims 
of “dissolving boundaries between 
science and society” or even societal 
de-differentiation, Hansen resorts to 
Luhmann’s theory of social systems 
with a twofold aim: On the one hand, 
he adheres to “socially significant dis-
tinctions” which, according to Hansen 
(2009: 74) “should not be overlooked 
or abandoned for both analytical and 
normative reasons”, namely the dis-
tinctions between science as a func-
tionally specialised (sub-)system and 
society or other subsystems such as 
politics or economy. As is well known, 
according to Luhmann, science con-
stitutes an autonomous subsystem by 
exclusively referring in its communica-
tive operations to the binary distinction 
of true vs. false. On the other hand, 
Hansen calls for greater attention to 
the differences between “two levels 
of social reality”, namely science as 
a subsystem of society and organiza-
tions such as universities or industrial 
R&D departments which operate with 
reference to more than one subsys-
temic code (Hansen 2009: 76). While it 
is certainly true that in “New Produc-
tion of Knowledge” and “Re-Thinking 
Society” de-differentiation often is too 
hastily proclaimed and levels of analy-
sis are not clearly separated, I have se-
rious doubts whether Luhmann’s theo-
ry provides a perspective to adequately 
capture the complex and flexible rela-
tions of science to the state, the econ-
omy, the media and the public in con-
temporary societies. I rather suspect 
that systems theory draws too static a 
picture of science as a self-referential 
communication system the “core” of 
which (the true-false distinction) is by 
definition immune to transformations.
Although this point would certainly 
deserve much more detailed elabora-
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tion, I can only very briefly sketch the 
argument here. Even if one admits 
that scientific communication “in the 
final instance” (Hansen 2009: 75) re-
curs upon a distinction between true 
and false, one should acknowledge 
that this conception of scientific com-
munication is equally restrictive and 
selective. In particular, it remains un-
specific with regard to a great number 
of issues which are exceedingly im-
portant both for the dynamics of sci-
ence and the relations of science and 
society but cannot be meaningfully ex-
pressed in terms of true or false – and, 
at the same time, offer various oppor-
tunities for the engagement of non-
scientific actors. A pertinent example 
is the choice of research questions 
and priorities which obviously cannot 
be judged as true or false but merely 
as more or less interesting, promis-
ing or relevant. Therefore it is hardly 
surprising that a broad range of actors 
(from politics, economy, civil society 
and the like) strive to influence, often 
successfully, the research agenda of 
science. A second case in point is the 
scientific creation and subsequent dif-
fusion of new entities such as GMOs, 
embryonic stem-cells, nanoparticles 
or human-animal chimaeras. Again, 
the question is not whether these en-
tities are “true” or “false” but whether 
it is considered acceptable, in terms 
of risk or ethical justification, to cre-
ate, utilize and release such entities. 
And again, social actors massively 
intervene in discussions on such is-
sues, as the fierce conflicts over agro-
biotechnology or stem cell research 
show. Further examples are the de-
bates on unknown and unforeseeable 
risks which result in a remarkable 
“politicization of non-knowledge” (cf. 
Wehling 2006b; Böschen et al. 2010) 
or conflicts over the design of clini-
cal drug tests and safety research on 
GMOs. In all these cases, important 
areas of scientific communication (or 
scientific practice, as I would prefer to 
say) are (potentially) opened to nego-
tiations with a variety of actors, thus 
confirming the heuristic and analyti-
cal relevance of concepts such as “so-
cially robust knowledge” or “socially 
distributed expertise”. Yet, what is not 
contested in all these cases is that sci-
entific communication is (or should 
be) about truth; what is debated and 
transformed, however, are the social 
contexts and the ways in which ques-
tions of true or false are addressed.
To put the argument briefly: With re-
gard to the relations between society 
and science and to emerging new 
modes of knowledge production in 
contemporary modernity, the ques-
tion of whether or not de-differentia-
tion occurs on the very general level 
of binary codes of communication is 
less important than most Luhmann-
ians as well as many of their critics 
usually believe. Instead, the focus on 
functional differentiation or de-dif-
ferentiation tends to distract our at-
tention from the far more significant 
developments on the “lower” levels of 
social reality. Thus the occasional talk 
of de-differentiation in the work of 
Nowotny and colleagues is sociologi-
cally less informative than the many 
examples they give of how the institu-
tionally fixed and stabilized “bounda-
ries” between science and society are 
contested, permeated, transgressed, 
and reconstructed.5
Conclusion
Both papers inspiringly contribute to 
renewing the debates on the mode 2 
thesis. They do not only point to its 
limitations but also sketch out promis-
ing perspectives to overcome some of 
these limitations, for instance by com-
parative research focusing on how the 
supposedly new relations between 
science and society differ across na-
tional, cultural, or institutional con-
texts. I suggest to conclude that the 
5  I agree with Hansen that the differences 
between science (or scientific practices) 
and, for instance, economic or political ac-
tion are also normatively significant; yet it 
is far from self-evident what practical con-
sequences should be drawn from this fact.
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mode 2 thesis should be understood 
and used as a “tool-box” of inspiring 
and sensitizing concepts (such as “so-
cially robust knowledge”) rather than 
as a (sociological) theory of “mode 2 
science” and “mode 2 society”. Nev-
ertheless, contrary to Hansen, I do not 
see the need nor the benefit of rem-
edying the weaknesses of the mode 
2 thesis by resorting to Luhmann’s 
systems theory, for this theory with its 
focus on the utterly abstract distinc-
tion of true and false has little to offer 
to adequately understand those new 
modes of interaction between science 
and society to which the mode 2 the-
sis has successfully drawn our atten-
tion.
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